



Scotland Yard's Anti-Afrikan Killer Mercenaries

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The Pan-Afrikan People's Phone-in is a space for themed interactive discussions conducted over the airwaves and cyberspace. The themes are focused around issues affecting Afrikan people both locally and globally.

The Pan-Afrikan People's Phone-in regularly features guests from revolutionary Pan-Afrikanist organisations. From time to time others including non-Afrikan guests will be invited to contribute. The activities of all guests will be examined on the basis of their relevance to Afrikan people locally and worldwide. Interviews and presentations with guests will set the scene for the more general discussion (in the second half of the programme) where listeners will be invited to phone in, ask questions and contribute.

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Scotland Yard's anti-Afrikan killer mercenaries

1 Destroying a gun free Afrikan community

1.1 The emergence of guns in the law biding Afrikan community

In the words of one capitalist:

"... drugs have a two-fold purpose; first to bring in colossal sums of money and second, to eventually turn a major part of the population into mindless drug zombies who will be easier to control than people who don't need drugs." (Coleman, 1997, p. 125).

In the 1970's, the Afrikan community was officially categorised as a low crime community (Gilroy, 1987, p. 92). Despite attempts to criminalise the Afrikan community, the police were not able to encourage the development of any major or organised categories of crime involving guns. Indeed, it is still widely acknowledged that throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's:

"... there was no real gun crime in Britain ... guns even in ... frontline areas, were still virtually unknown. Police officers who spent years patrolling there say they simply never came across them". (Davison, 1997, p. 2)

The proliferation of guns within the Afrikan community coincided with the flooding of the community with 'crack' cocaine. The police operative (possibly an MI6 operative posing as a journalist) and enemy of Afrikan people, John Davison has observed:

"... the criminal use of guns has increased parallel with the domestic drugs trade and in particular with the emergence of 'crack' cocaine." (Davison, 1997, p. 3)

This analysis is supported by Oxfam and Amnesty International who argue that:

"Illegal drugs militarise communities. The cultivation, processing and distribution of drugs establish and concentrate power in the hands of those involved; they create an environment dominated by guns, used to maintain and protect interests involved, to stifle dissent and extort 'taxation'." (Hillier, 2003, p. 51)

1.2 Capitalism's drug policing problem

The principal purpose of the capitalist state is the protection of private property. When capitalists own property that is classified as 'legal', they use state mechanisms to prevent other people from stealing it. In situations where their property is 'stolen', they employ the police force, the courts and the prison force to exact retribution. However, a problem occurs in relation to private property such as cocaine and other drugs. These items are 'illegal',

meaning that the usual systems for keeping 'law and order' (i.e. capitalism's control of society) do not apply. At the superficial level, the capitalist cannot go to the police, the courts and the prisons to protect or to seek the return of illegal drugs.

'Illegal' private property creates a situation where capitalism's overt process for keeping 'order' cannot be applied. When the usual systems of capitalist 'law and order' break down or do not apply, mercenaries are brought in to perform the task of policing and punishment on behalf of the capitalist state structure. The mercenaries perform the role of the police and their guns cover the roles of the courts and the prisons. However, the capitalist state structure must maintain control of the mercenaries and this is done through the state mechanism using the police force. The official policing structure manages the unofficial secret police force of mercenaries and undercover police so as to prevent anarchy.

1.3 Organised Chaos: Planned via the gun

Cocaine has proved to be a tremendous source of profit for the capitalists that control the international industry in illegal drugs. However, the environment within which that drug dealing takes place is riddled with untrustworthy characters. This market differs from capitalism's 'legal' money making ventures, in that this source of income cannot command the overt protection of the law. This means that the drug economy capitalists cannot formally call on the state for protection of their profits; as a result, alternative means of protection have had to be developed.

During the late 1980's in Britain, these alternative means led to the clandestine creation of an unofficial police force. A force of gun wielding killer mercenaries imported from overseas. They were commissioned by the capitalists as a means of protecting their massive drug profits from being 'stolen'. This unofficial killer mercenary police force secretly operated under the structures of the official police force at Scotland Yard. The gun toting killer mercenaries were really secret policemen, an undercover appendage to the British state's policy mechanism. They had to be issued with guns because it was the main tactic for guaranteeing that they would not be robbed of the money or the drugs in their possession. Such robberies could not be allowed because they would undermine the profits of the capitalist drug barons. The guns were also necessary because the killer mercenaries' other key purpose was to help oppress and criminalise the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community by changing it into a ready market for hard drugs and guns.

Whilst the capitalists picked up the massive profits from the unlawful cocaine trade, the Afrikan community was left to pick up the consequences of the deadly cocktail of a drug economy protected by killer mercenary gunmen. These killer mercenaries or secret killer policemen were brought in from overseas and paid handsomely by the British state. In addition to their substantial regular payments, they supplemented their income with their drug

pushing activities 'on the streets'. The killer mercenaries were ruthless to the point of being willing to shoot and kill innocent unsuspecting Afrikan civilians; one is known to have confessed to carrying out 11 murders against his own kith and kin.

Guns were also being carried by smaller scale criminals, who were often associates of the killer mercenaries. The criminal associates actively scavenged for whatever crumbs they could get from the highly profitable drug trade profits. Their small scale drug trading activities meant that they 'needed' the 'protection' of guns also. The criminal associates of the killer mercenaries soon learnt to be equally ruthless. They became willing to kill to protect the crumbs that fell in their direction from the massive drug profits.

Furthermore, the dangers of their working environment meant that they also had to be willing to kill in order to protect their own lives. The situation became even more unstable when some of the criminal associates involved in the drug dealing scavenging process carried guns whilst they were under the influence of hard drugs. The devastation bit even deeper into the Afrikan community when the criminal associate's, some of them doped up, began to actively use their guns.

The mere pointing of a gun at somebody is a substantial threat to that person's life. It puts the victim totally at the mercy of the gunman. The victim or anybody fearing that in the future, they could be in that defenceless situation must take precautions in advance. One of those precautions is to procure a gun. If a similar situation arises, they can 'protect' themselves with their 'piece'. In this new style confrontation both parties have guns. On top of that, they are both influenced by their knowledge of the high rate of ruthless gun killings in the community.

This influence brings another critical problem. In a situation where two gunmen are pointing guns at each other, both in the knowledge that there is a pattern of people being regularly shot dead, the risk associated with not shooting first is too great. The only way for each of them to guarantee the preservation of their own life is to shoot first. It follows that at least one gun will almost certainly be fired. Firing the gun, most likely, brings with it the death or serious injury of one or both parties. If there is a survivor, he must live in fear, because friends of his dead victim are likely to be willing to take drastic measures in revenge.

These kinds of processes actually occurred in the Afrikan community and each murder led to reprisal murders. The initial reprisals in turn created more reprisal murders which led to a 'never ending' negative spiral of tit for tat murders. Some of those murdered were victims of police paid killer mercenaries; others were victims of their drug dealing criminal associates; yet others were innocent victims killed as a result of mistaken identity or for being in the wrong place at the wrong time; but many more were the victims of vengeance attacks. Each

new death brought a new set of angry friends into the carnage with an agenda of revenge. An environment was therefore created where there was an increased likelihood of gun use amongst people never before connected with this kind of extreme violence.

The resulting unstable situation also meant that, anybody in a dispute with someone they thought might have access to a gun, felt the need to have their own gun 'for protection'. In an environment now riddled with the regular gun killings of Afrikan people, even innocent Afrikan people, unconnected with the drug market, are feeling the 'need' to own a gun as a means of preserving their own lives. All of this has helped to foster to the stark reality that:

The proliferation of [guns] has contributed to the widespread public fear and insecurity, and the culture of violence is increasingly evident as weapons are used with impunity ..." (Hillier, 2003, p. 85)

Amidst all of the confusion deliberately channelled into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community, a crucial aspect of the role of the killer mercenaries was to train new locally grown killer mercenaries, equal to their instructors in brutality. The new killer mercenaries were to take over the secret drug policing role that would be vacated by their instructors when the old guard's temporary drug policing contract came to an end. This explains how the spiral of gun killings in the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community was the direct result of a planned assault by capitalist drug barons and British state forces including the police. The capitalists brought the drugs in to make profits. They brought the killer mercenaries and their guns into our communities in order to protect those profits and quell Afrikan uprisings.

1.4 Little real crime in the Afrikan community

As far fetched as it may sound nowadays, in the 1970's, the Afrikan community was officially categorised as a low crime community (Gilroy, 1987, p. 92). The police were forced to use the now infamous 'sus law' (Section 4 and 6, Vagrancy Act, 1824) to criminalise youths in the relatively crime free Afrikan community in Britain. When the Afrikan community exposed the thoroughly immoral and racist nature of the police's use of the 'sus law', the police invented the idea that Afrikan youths were something that they described as 'muggers'. Despite the fact that legally, there was no such thing as 'mugging' the police happily used the invention as an excuse to attack and criminalise Afrikan youths.

Most recently, the police have pulled out their trump card and falsely accused Afrikan youths of being 'gun toting drug dealers'. This now gives police the opportunity to blame all of society's ills on Afrikan youths, with the added 'bonus' that they can now shoot Afrikan youths dead in public and in broad daylight with impunity.

The Afrikan community has been the victim of a calculated series of malicious lies designed

to assassinate its character. This campaign of lies forms part of a low intensity warfare technique referred to in British and US Satan military circles as 'Psy-ops' (Psychological operations) (Kitson, 1974, p. 77; Thomson, 2002, p. 62). Through a series of self-defence campaigns, the Afrikan grass roots community defeated the 'sus law' (Suspicion law) lie in 1981 (House of Commons); it defeated the 'mugging' lie; it must now rise to the challenge and defeat the 'gun toting drug dealer' lie.

1.5 A case study in drug criminalisation

In 1988 the Met Police set up 'Operation Lucy' to investigate what they called 'black organised crime'. It was headed by Detective Chief Superintendent Roy Ramm (Davison, 1997, p. 29). In January 1991 this character testified in a British court in defence of Roy Garner – who was sentenced to 22 years for his involvement in a plot to smuggle a 392kg consignment of cocaine valued at £100m into Britain (Jennings, 1990, p. 3 & 180). At the time, this was the largest amount ever seized. The fact that Ramm and his Scotland Yard colleagues were defending a major drug smuggler rather than trying to convict him must raise serious questions about his and the Yard's credibility in the fight against illegal drugs. Operation Lucy was part of the serious crime branch, headed by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Simon Crawshaw (Davison, 1997, p. 40).

Roy Ramm



By 24th February 1988 Crawshaw, was forced to admit that:

"There is no black mafia." (Davison, 1997, p. 40)

However, this seems to have been misunderstood by his subordinates, who busied themselves searching for something that they knew was not there. At 5:30pm on 14th April

1988 Scotland Yard's 'Operation Lucy' raided an Afrikan party in Clapton, East London. (Davison, 1997, p. 41). This was a coordinated military attack launched against a set of innocent Afrikan party goers. Apparently, its purpose was to capture someone the police described as the 'top Yardie in the world'. It comprised 60 police officers drawn from:

- Operation Lucy
- The local division
- The recently formed Territorial Support Group (Davison, 1997, p. 41) and
- 'The press were invited along for the fun' (Davison, 1997, p. 40)

Of the 70 unsuspecting Afrikan people innocently enjoying themselves in the party half were women. Since both women and men were in the venue to enjoy themselves rather than to engage in an armed battle with the British police, it is not surprising that 'little resistance was offered' (Davison, 1997, p. 41) by the stunned party goers when they found themselves under attack by Scotland Yard's calculated military campaign. All 70 of them were captured and held as prisoners of war.

All of the innocent Afrikan party goers were forced to lie face down on the concrete floor; they were all handcuffed with new style plastic handcuffs; and on top of all of this they were photographed by the media and police photographers which further entrench their humiliation. However, more important than entrenching the humiliation of the Afrikan people targeted, was the role of the media in carrying out a military style 'Psy-ops' campaign. The purpose of the 'Psy-ops' campaign was to broadcast to the world a false and misleading image of Afrikan gangsters being caught in a criminal act. The media's misleading story line would suggest that these innocent unsuspecting Afrikan party goers were so ferocious that they could only be subdued by heavily armed police. In fact, the raid which caught 'the top Yardie in the World' along with some 70 other innocent Afrikan people recovered:

- A single machete
- A single knife
- 3 bags of marijuana
- Smaller amounts of cocaine (Davison, 1997, p. 41)

Out of the 70 Afrikan party subjected to total abuse and humiliation in the police force's military raid: 5 were charged with an offence; but no evidence is presented that any of the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan party goers was convicted of any crime.

The so called Godfather's trial took place on 7th November 1988, but surprisingly, the CPS offered no evidence against him. Instead he was deported to Jamaica where he was wanted for allegedly killing police officers. Whilst in Jamaica he somehow jumped bail and went to

Toronto, Canada, where he tried to claim political asylum. Unfortunately for him his claim failed. He then voluntarily flew back to Jamaica. The police force in Jamaica, appear to have forgotten about his alleged killing of some of their colleagues or his jail break and failed to arrest or convict him of anything. Apparently, he was last sighted in 1995 in Birmingham, England (Davison, 1997, p. 42), where he was alleged to have been living.

This whole episode is extremely puzzling because, the supposed purpose of this anti-Afrikan military exercise was to capture what an un-named police superintendent called the godfather of the 'Yardies', or in his words:

"... not only the top Yardie in Britain but in the world". (Davison, 1997, p. 42)

If this military raid was designed to show the world that Afrikan people in Britain were major criminals, it completely failed. In addition to there being no convictions, it is also crystal clear that the 'top Yardie in the world' and his associates were not in possession of guns. The pattern of his treatment in the criminal injustice system suggests that the 'top Yardie in the world' was actually a police informer, brought in from overseas. Scotland Yard's attempt to entrap members of the innocent Afrikan community in Britain into appearing to be criminals had failed.

The Operation Lucy fiasco exposed a very serious contradiction at Scotland Yard. Senior police officers such as Roy Ramm were busying themselves covering up the truth about arch criminals known to be involved in smuggling vast quantities of cocaine into Britain. At the same time Roy Ramm and his colleagues were using tax payer's money to create fake cover stories designed to give the impression that the totally innocent Afrikan community was responsible for cocaine smuggling into Britain. To this extent, they were manifestly deceiving the British public in order to protect drug smugglers. Could it be that Roy Ramm, Scotland Yard and the British state had a vested interest in guiding the public's attention away from the truth about who was really responsible for the massive cocaine smuggling cartels that flooded the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community? If this is so, their actions would almost certainly have been criminal.

Operation Lucy was disbanded in 1989 (Davison, 1997, p. 140). Since there really was no serious crime in the Afrikan community, Scotland Yard's role would be to put it there. In future Scotland Yard would not import mere unarmed informers, because there was nothing to inform on; instead they would import armed killer mercenaries to lay the blame on the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community, for the increase in drugs on the streets of Britain. An important by-product of their role would also be to carry out the task of actually criminalising and thereby further victimising the innocent unsuspecting and law bidding Afrikan community.

2 Neo-colonial intrigue: Police's mercenary gunman let loose in Britain

2.1 An example of an imported assassin

Eaton Green was one of several multiple murderers brought to London as killer mercenaries by Scotland Yard. The exploration of all of the examples is beyond the scope of this piece of work. Nonetheless the example of Eaton Green's activities in Britain and beyond gives a clear indication of the calibre of attack launched by the state against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain.

One of the things that Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries had in common was that they initially arrived as strangers to London. They had to be chaperoned and led around London by undercover police agents (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 74 & 77). They even had to be shown where to go to find high concentrations of Afrikan people for them to attack (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 74). Since they did not know their way around town, it is highly unlikely that they would have had street contacts able to supply them with guns; nor would they have had money of their own in order to purchase guns. Their guns, which they used to devastating effect, had to have been supplied via Scotland Yard and its local network of contacts.

On 31st May 1993, a group of approximately 150 Afrikans were innocently enjoying themselves at a party in Nottingham. The party was suddenly disrupted by a group of gun toting bandits describing themselves as the 'seek and destroy posse'. Davison describes how:

"Everything was taken in the haul – wallets, cards, cash, jewellery and mobile phones. Even rings were unceremoniously yanked from people's fingers." (Davidson, 1997, p. 183)

When one of the partygoers dared to protest against the theft and other acts of ill treatment, he was simply and casually shot. Literally adding insult to injury, whilst he was bleeding on the floor he was mocked and cursed. As bad as this incident was, even greater shocks were to emerge with the news that:

"In the course of two subsequent trials about the robbery it was revealed that the gunman who fired the shot ... [Eaton Green] ... was on the police payroll at the time of the shooting." (Davidson, 1997, p. 183)

As this example of Eaton Green's behaviour proves, guns were used by Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries to terrorise the unarmed Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain (Gillard, 2004, p. 239). Since this and other aspects of gun violence happened at the hand of

known murderers on Scotland Yard's payroll, the possibility that the British police supplied the guns to the killer mercenaries cannot be discounted.

2.2 Transferring guns to criminals

The case of Paul Bruce, a self-confessed state sponsored multiple murderer, is instructive here. He carried out his murdering spree whilst he was a British soldier operating as part of the killer SAS (Special Air Services) squad. Bruce testified that the British army supplied him and his colleagues with illegal fire arms. These fire arms were then used to carry out systematic 'cold blooded' murders on the streets of the United Kingdom. Bruce then went on to reveal that the identities of the illegal weapons were tampered with in order to conceal their origin. (Bruce, 1996, p. 122).

Bruce's evidence illustrates the fact that the British state has access to sources of illegal firearms. These firearms are then issued to the state's undercover agents for use on the streets of the United Kingdom. Paul Bruce's experience can perhaps contribute to our understanding of how Eaton Green and other killer mercenaries on Scotland Yard's payroll came to have illegal fire arms in their possession.

Bruce's evidence opens up other possibilities when it is contrasted with the evidence of another self-confessed British spy. We are informed that:

"In Britain, SAS members work on 'special detail' with the police special branch in all major cities."
(Bloch, 1983, p. 45)

Many unsolved so called 'Black on Black' killings that are promoted by the British media may actually be targeted **SAS on Afrikan killings**. If so, the murders are deliberately designed to look like Afrikans are killing fellow Afrikans. They will have been carried out in order to stimulate 'gang feuds' within the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community for the precise purpose of adding to the body count. Bruce's evidence may also help to explain why it is that the 'police' who shoot dead Afrikan people on the streets of Britain are not named, even in court proceedings. There is the distinct possibility that they are really trained SAS murderers whose identities must be protected at all costs.

The case of the relationship between police informer Roy Garner and the police officer Peter Docherty provides additional evidence of the transfer of guns between the police force and their undercover agents. In May 1983 Roy Garner startled a British courtroom when he made the following confession under oath. He admitted:

"I walked around with [police officer Peter Docherty] and I became interested in shooting. [Police officer Peter Docherty] brought a couple of guns along. [Police officer Peter Docherty] obtained a

shotgun which I bought and [police officer Peter Docherty] assisted me in applying for the certificate. I purchased a number of guns through [police officer Peter Docherty]. (Jennings, 1990, p. 110)

Even after this startling revelation was made public, Detective Sergeant Peter Docherty's role as Garner's gun supplier did not damage his career at Scotland Yard. This example may also contribute to our understanding of how Eaton Green and the other secret policemen came by their guns.

There is also evidence of police officers having, not only direct access to armouries, but also making use of the guns within them. For instance, Sergeant Gerry Carroll was a police officer heavily implicated in the drug corruption scandals at the notorious Stoke Newington police station. He went to the police armoury, took out a shot gun and allegedly used it to blow a hole in his own chest (Gillard, 2004, p. 70). Whether he shot himself or whether he was shot by one of his police colleagues is not the central point of enquiry at this juncture. The point here is that if he could take a gun from the police armoury to kill himself, then other police officers could equally take guns from the police armoury and 'loan' them to the gun toting killer mercenaries employed by Scotland Yard to terrorise the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in London.

2.3 The anti-Afrikan terrorism went beyond gun crime

Gun crime was not the only area of anti-Afrikan mercenary terrorism. In fact in retrospect and based on the actions of known killer mercenaries, we are able to construct a job description, illustrating some of the detailed acts of terrorism which they carried out on Scotland Yard's behalf. The killer mercenaries were allowed to:

- Mix with criminals for the purpose of 'putting [criminal] deals together' (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 89)
- Introduce official under cover police officers to criminal gangs (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 76)
- Set up their own criminal gangs, with police approval (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 89)
- Handle counterfeit traveller's cheques (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 87)
- Import, distribute and sell cocaine in the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 86)
- Carry guns around with them to terrorise the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain and other parts of Europe (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 68, 90, 91 & 92)
- Threaten to shoot innocent Afrikans in a busy high street in broad daylight (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 68)

- Buy and sell stolen goods including guns complete with ammunition (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 87)
- Attend weekly debriefings with their handler – sex maniac killer mercenary Delroy Denton was handled by Detective Superintendent Donald Matthews (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 90) – their meetings kept him up to date with the killer mercenary's criminal activities
- Rob innocent Afrikan party goers (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 90 & 91)
- Shoot innocent Afrikan party goers (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Terrify innocent Afrikan party goers (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Run protection rackets (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Extort money from Afrikan businesses (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Visit crack houses (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 81)
- Sell crack cocaine on a regular basis (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Run prostitution networks (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Rape and murder innocent Afrikan women (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 91)
- Recruit other killer mercenaries from overseas (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 89) so that they could commit further criminal acts against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community

2.4 Job description of an anti-Afrikan undercover police officer

Philip Etienne (Bernard and Etienne, 2000) later confessed to being one of the police officers responsible for supervising, chaperoning and making payments to bandits like Eaton Green. The Nottingham shooting formed only a tiny part of the criminal reign of terror perpetrated against the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community by these police killer mercenaries. On several occasions, the police officer Etienne actually escorted one of the bandits whilst he committed a range of criminal acts against innocent unsuspecting Afrikan people at tax payers' expense.

Again, as with the actual killer mercenaries, it is also possible for us to retrospectively determine the real job description of undercover police officers, based on Etienne's self-confessed behaviours:

- 'I had to do whatever he (the killer mercenary) said' (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 66)
- 'Keep Shank (Delroy Denton - the rapist killer mercenary) happy' (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 66)
- Be the 'right hand man' of the killer mercenary (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 77)
- Be the killer mercenary's chaperon (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 74)
- Be the chauffeur of the killer mercenary (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 77)

- Familiarise the killer mercenary with the night clubs, pubs, bars and restaurants frequented by Afrikans (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 74)
- Familiarise the killer mercenary with London (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 90) and then leave the killer mercenary to his own devices (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 90)
- Oversee the imported criminal murders criminal activities and protect him
- Turn a blind eye to the killer mercenary's state sanctioned criminal deals (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 87)
- Support the killer mercenary when he committed crimes (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 68)
- Including driving the killer mercenary away from the crime scene (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 70)
- And visiting crack houses and witnessing drug misuse and doing nothing about it (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 81)
- Arrange, book and pay for the flights of killer mercenaries to come and commit crime in Britain (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 77 & 89) using the met. police's secret company credit cards
- Arrange, book and pay for hotel accommodation and more permanent housing for the imported criminal killer mercenaries, using the met. police's secret company credit cards (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 89 & 90)
- Buy a £12,000 Golf GTI car for the killer mercenary (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 77) using the met. police's secret company credit cards

2.5 Lavish funding and the procurement of guns

Another aspect of the police officer's role involved making payments in kind to the bandits with his official police credit card. The bandits were well rewarded for their police sponsored criminality. One of them received a remuneration package that comprised:

- A 'Lifestyle payment' of £500 per week (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 73, 79 & 90),
- With all expenses paid and settled on a weekly basis (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 73, 79 & 90)
- An undisclosed weekly salary (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 73)
- Direct payments (i.e. fees) for information provided at a rate of up to £1000 a time: This operated as a kind of bonus scheme (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 73)
- A mobile phone with all bills paid (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 79)
- A £12,000 Golf GTI car (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 79)
- Long-term accommodation in a Mayfair hotel: The 'Cleveland hotel Marble Arch' (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 79) was initially used to house one of the bandits, but when he complained that this was not good enough he was given 'a brand new 4th floor 2 bedroom flat at Phoenix court in the Docklands' at a cost of £550 per week (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 89 & 90)

The way in which British taxpayers' money was lavished on known murderers, brought to Britain to terrorise and destabilise Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities, is of itself a cause of great concern. In the light of this glaring contradiction the sell-out Afrikan police officer Philip Etienne felt obliged to make a personal comment on their overly generous remuneration package. He was simple and to the point as he exclaimed:

"From the off, the operation was going to cost a fortune." (Bernard and Etienne, 2000, p. 79)

No expense was spared in Scotland Yard's campaign of terrorism against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain (Gillard, 2004). The funding of this 'project' was literally so generous that everything that the killer mercenaries needed was supplied without a quibble. There can be little doubt that guns were an essential feature supporting the role of Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries. Since guns are likely to cost less than £12,000, it is likely that the budget would have easily accommodated supplying Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries with firearms.

The funding is therefore another important clue relating to the arming of the killer mercenaries. The generous funding arrangements leave little doubt that the killer mercenaries' guns were supplied by Scotland Yard. Either the police force supplied the killer mercenaries with their guns 'up front' – in a manner consistent with SAS operations; or the police force provided the killer mercenaries with the money with which they purchased guns from illegal firearms dealers.

The killer mercenaries were generally made to live in the 'fast lane'. They needed to do as much damage as they could to the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in the shortest possible time. In fact, there seems to have been very little time for Eaton Green - Scotland Yard's killer mercenary, to rest. His paymasters appear to have kept him very busy causing mayhem in London prior to sending him to Nottingham:

"Evidence has since emerged that Green [Scotland Yard's killer mercenary] was involved in quite a few other bits of badness while on Scotland Yard's books – including running protection rackets, selling crack and regularly carrying a gun ...". (Davison, 1997, p. 187)

2.6 Transferring illegal guns across borders

As if these areas of criminality were not enough, he also ran prostitution rackets (Etienne and Bernard, 2000, p. 91). On top of the devastation that he caused in Britain, there also appears to have been a pan-European dimension to the drug operation because the killer mercenary Eaton Green:

"... was sent to Holland by Scotland Yard ... [and] ... while there he used an Uzi sub-machine gun to rob other [drug] dealers". (Davison, 1997, p. 187)

The idea that the British police arranged for the killer mercenaries on their payroll to get through customs whilst carrying guns remains a scenario that must be taken seriously. At the time when Eaton Green was turning up with firearms in Holland, Britain's outgoing chief warmonger and head of the British army was General De La Billiere. Billiere later revealed his private system for getting undeclared illegal fire arms through Customs. He recalled how he once got himself out of a slightly sticky situation when he found that a friend, staying in his flat, was in possession of an illegal fire arm. He said:

"Having spent the night in my flat, and being about to return to Germany, [my friend – Wenger] casually said, 'Oh, by the way: I'm carrying a pistol. What shall I do about it at the airport?' ... [I was] ... harbouring a foreigner armed with an undeclared weapon. I rang my friends at the Metropolitan Police and explained what had happened. Their reaction could not have been more helpful: they cut through the red tape, sent four men round in a van, escorted [my friend] Wenger to the airport and saw him onto the aeroplane, all without a murmur." (Billiere, 1994, p. 327).

The warmonger's testimony is proof conclusive that when it comes to smuggling lethal ballistic weapons across international borders, the British police force has a well oiled system. Naturally, Scotland Yard's well oiled smuggling system could help to explain how Eaton Green managed to have an Uzi sub-machine gun in his possession, whilst he was in Holland.

3 Dirty beast senior police

3.1 Reparations from unrepentant racists

Institutionally racist Scotland Yard remain completely unrepentant for their premeditated crime against humanity via their use of killer mercenaries. They have complete failed to apologise to the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community for the genocidal assault that they continue to perpetrate against us. Furthermore, they have not made mention of even an intention, on their part, to make appropriate reparations to the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community. This is despite the glaringly obvious nature of their inhumane criminal assault against us. Instead they have shamelessly tried to bury the history of their role in this wicked act of anti-Afrikan genocide. In fact:

"If Scotland Yard had got its way none of the information that has emerged would have become public knowledge at all. Once it became unavoidable that [Eaton Green – Scotland Yard's mercenary] would have to be named as an informant ... at trial ... at Leicester Crown Court in September 1994, Grieve and other senior officers at Scotland Yard did everything in their power to have the whole prosecution dropped". (Davison, 1997, p. 186)

The 'rule of law' is one of the popularised myths of the British constitution. This bogus concept is fed to the British public while the state flouts this alleged principle at will. Eaton Green's 'special' treatment is testimony to the 'above the law' status afforded to Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries by the British state. They committed heinous crimes including rape of a minor, running prostitution rackets, drug dealing and firearms offences to name a few. All of these charges were dropped (Gillard, 2004, p. 239). Even after Green was convicted of serious crimes, his police friends still managed to keep him out of prison. Instead:

"After his conviction, SO11 [Scotland Yard's special branch operation] moved him to a safe house ... while there he confessed to 11 murders, including one carried out on the instructions of a senior Jamaican politician. No attempt was made to investigate these crimes". (Davison, 1997, p. 187)

3.2 The anti-Afrikan genocide was planned from the top

The idea of bringing gun toting killer mercenaries into the streets of Britain could not have been sanctioned by low or middle ranking police officers. Evidence has emerged to support the notion that even the police commissioner does not have sufficient authority to take this calibre of decision. He operates as an advisor to the 'top' and takes operational responsibility once the 'top' of the British government's chain of command gives the go ahead. In other words, only the Prime minister can make this calibre of decision.

The head of the armed forces and chief British warmonger when Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries were let loose to attack the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain was the former commander of the SAS Peter De La Billiere. He was later to admit that state sponsored gunmen were not let loose on the streets of Britain without the expressed command of the Prime Minister. He confirmed that during an operation when he was commander of the SAS:

"... Whitelaw [the Home Secretary] tried to telephone the Prime Minister, to obtain her approval for sending in the SAS ... she gave her consent. Whitelaw then said to me, 'Right, you can send them in ... [police commander Mike Rose] insisted that he must have written authority for the assault (in case someone should later claim that he had exceeded his brief) ..." (Billiere, 1994, p. 331).

His testimony makes the point crystal clear; only the Prime Minister is empowered to allow state sanctioned gunmen onto the streets of Britain. De La Billiere also explained the context and rationale behind the employment of state sponsored gunmen on the streets of Britain. He said:

"... the decision to let the SAS loose in the streets of London was not one to be taken lightly: clearly there was a risk, if a large scale shoot out occurred, that a considerable number of people might be

killed ...The chain of command was complex but clearly defined. As always in the United Kingdom, police primacy remained absolute: the army could act only if the Home Secretary authorised it to do so." (Billiere, 1994, p. 322).

The general's evidence is consistent with the confession made by the self-confessed SAS assassin, Paul Bruce. Bruce informed us that his murdering spree on the streets of the UK was 'authorised' at the 'highest level' (Bruce, 1996, p. 149). Though he fell short of defining what he meant by the term, the 'highest level', he presented photographs in his book of 'top' state officials including: Edward Heath – the contemporaneous Prime Minister; Willie Whitelaw – the contemporaneous Home Secretary and Frank Kitson – a future head of the British armed forces (Bruce, 1996, p. 196). Against the background of the testimony of Bruce's former commander, General Billiere, the inference can be reasonably drawn that it was the Prime Minister that gave the go ahead for the murders.

It is clear that only the Prime Minister has the authority to give the command for members of the Britain's armed forces to be allowed to carry out a military campaign on the streets of the UK. This level of authority could not therefore be lowered for a decision allowing state sponsored foreign killer mercenaries to carry out military operations against British citizens on Britain's streets. We can therefore reasonably conclude that the attack against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain was sanctioned by Margaret Thatcher, the serving Prime Minister when this decision was taken in the late 1980's.

No police officer has ever been arrested, charged, prosecuted or convicted for their part in this calculated campaign of terrorism carried out by Scotland Yard against the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain. It is not unreasonable to conclude therefore, that their anti-Afrikan criminal actions have been sanctioned by the British state.

Furthermore, there is a system in place which the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet can use to cover their decisions from unwelcome exposure to the legal system. The Public Interest Immunity certificate (PII) can:

"... be sought by the British government to protect official secrets, and so can be perceived as a gagging order. Where a minister believes that PII applies, he signs a PII certificate ... Generally, a court will allow a claim of PII without inspecting the documents ..." (The Free Dictionary)

This potentially gives Ministers free scope to make serious errors or even premeditated corrupt decisions. In addition to protecting Ministers, the PII can also provide benefits for a police force that has the 'confidence' of the Home Secretary. With forethought it can operate as a kind of blank cheque system of police cover. If abused, the police can commit whatever crimes they choose to, confident that they can get a PII certificate to cover their unlawful

activities. Under these circumstances, the police will never have the answer for their conduct in a court of law. Alternatively, the PII can be used in retrospect. In this case, it can operate a bit like toilet paper, to confidentially wipe away any police mess where serious criminality has already happened. However, regardless of how it is used, the Prime Minister is still the ultimate authority.

3.3 Recruiting killer mercenaries to attack innocent Afrikan communities

Additional evidence indicating that the decision to import killer mercenaries to attack the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community must have come from the 'highest level', is revealed by the elaborate recruitment processes employed. Only the 'highest level' could have given authorisation for:

"A team of senior officers from Scotland Yard [to travel] to Kingston, Jamaica, with the express intention of recruiting ... gangsters to work as informants in London." (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 73) ... [They] "... travelled over to Jamaica and hand picked a selection of ... gangsters who would be travelling to London over the coming months." (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 76).

The process of recruiting professional criminals to act as killer mercenaries for the British state is an old tactic of MI6, borrowed by Scotland Yard (Bloch, 1983, p. 37). Among Scotland Yard's team taking the trip were Detective superintendent Donald Mathews of SO10 and Detective superintendent Roy Gunn of SO11 (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 76). Mathews was the handler, supervising the activities of the notorious Scotland Yard killer mercenary Delroy Denton. Denton is a sex maniac who was convicted of the sadistic rape and murder of an innocent Afrikan woman, Marcia Lawes. This heinous crime was committed whilst he was under the stewardship of his unapologetic police supervisor DS Mathews. Denton had previously boasted to the metropolitan police about murdering 'no fewer than seven women in Kingston' Jamaica (McLagan, 2006, p. p. 47).

Perhaps we should not be surprised by the sadistic nature of this and other crimes committed by the killer mercenaries when known murderers were actively recruited. The police, who supposedly exist to prevent crime, were given permission from the 'highest level' to select and recruit killer mercenaries and other criminals to terrorise the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain. These killer mercenaries were deliberately drawn from pools of:

- Criminals who had previously been deported from Britain on drugs and fire arms charges
- Criminals who had been recommended by other killer mercenaries with a record of criminal activity in Britain
- Criminals who had worked for the Jamaican police force as informants, and
- Criminals who were seen as 'good bets' (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 73)

Gunn and Matthews formed part of a team of senior police officers at Scotland Yard who were assembled with the blessing of the 'highest level' for the tactical supervision of the imported killer mercenaries' murders, shootings, rapes, drug running and other acts of anti-Afrikan terrorism. The team included:

- Head of SO11 Malcolm Stone
- DS Roy Gunn (SO11)
- DS Chris Taylor (SO10)
- DS Donald Matthews (SO10) (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 76)

Further evidence that this anti-Afrikan terrorist initiative was sanctioned at the 'highest level' is revealed by the fact that this team formed part of a 'joint initiative involving police, customs and immigration ...' (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 72). In fact it is confirmed that the highly experienced killer mercenary Eaton Green was 'giving top grade information ... to the Met, the Home Office, Customs, the Jamaican authorities and the New York District Attorney' (McLagan, 2006, p. 45). The bringing of different sometimes antagonistic branches of the state together to work on controversial projects almost certainly requires orders from the upper echelons of government.

The original police trip to Jamaica to recruit gangsters to work as killer mercenaries against Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain was not a one-off event. It appears to have been part of an organised series of recruitment episodes supported by a process of monitoring. In June 1992, the notorious Detective Chief Superintendent Roy Clark, former manager of the drug recycling den otherwise known as Stoke Newington Police Station and official representative of Scotland Yard was sent to Jamaica and New York to make 'an assessment of the situation'. (Davison, 1997, p. 167).

He used this as an opportunity to recommend the recruitment of more killer mercenaries (McLagan, 2006, p. 43). He then used the murderous results of his own recommendation as a basis for recommending that all 'Jamaican' citizens be forced to produce visas in order to enter the UK (McLagan, 2006, p. 43). Again, this kind of follow up trip formed part of a systematic monitoring process which would almost certainly have had the go ahead from the 'highest level'.

It is difficult to imagine how the police force could have justified a plan to recruit known murders; how the police force could have supported this totally outrageous idea with a team of senior police officers; how the police force could have sent those senior officers on a trip to Jamaica; how all of this could have happened whilst they were working as part of an inter-departmental government alliance, unless there was authorisation from the 'very top' of the British government's chain of command. Nor has any police officer gone to prison or been

convicted of any crime as a result of their role in supporting the criminal activities of the killer mercenaries, whose acts of terrorism included shootings, rapes, drug running and cold blooded murders. This is consistent with the view expressed by one former British secret agent that:

"Mercenaries are preferred if the British government wishes to support [a community destabilisation programme], for it is sensitive to allegations of subversion and careful to preserve its international reputation." (Bloch, 1983, p. 46)

4 The consequences for the Afrikan community in Britain

4.1 Calculated anti-Afrikan police attacks

The culprit who was operationally responsible for bringing Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries onto the streets of London, was Paul Condon the then Metropolitan Police Commissioner. In June 1992, he had the audacity to complain that the gun violence created by the killer mercenaries on his payroll had 'got out of hand' (Davison, 1997, p. 166). He then made the threat that the rise in terrorism and gun crime, which he had initially planned, could lead to Britain's policeman being routinely armed. His threat continued:

'There will be more and more specialist units and more and more officers on the streets who will have to be armed ... it could happen within 10 to 20 years'. (Davison, 1997, p. 166).

Fifteen years later, his threat has materialised. At the very least, it can be fairly argued that the guns and fear of guns that now hold innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain would not have gained such a hold had Scotland Yard not brought their gun toting killer mercenaries to attack the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain (Davison, 1997, p. 29). In fact, in retrospect we can see how the increase in gun crime and the associated arming of the police was a calculated plan, hatched by the drug baron capitalists and carried out by the British state and its police force. This point was at least partially acknowledged by one of the culprits directly involved in the genocide:

"In the years that followed, there was a sevenfold increase in the number of gun incidents in London alone, virtually all of it down to [Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries]. Their willingness to brandish and use guns forced other criminals – black and white – to do the same or risk being ripped off or killed. The introduction of armed response vehicles, the issuing of bullet-proof jackets for officers on standard beat patrol – all of that was because of [Scotland Yard's killer mercenaries] too." (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 71).

The anti-Afrikan criminal police commissioner had brought the gun toting killer mercenaries onto the streets of London and then threatened to arm the police with guns because of the outcome of his genocidal decision. There can be little doubt therefore that from the outset,

one of the aims of bringing killer mercenaries, with a track record of murdering people, into innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities, was to create an environment where the unwitting general public would be seduced by the arguments of those calling for the arming of the police. In fact, this sadistic plan was exercised so convincingly that there were even some extremely naïve Afrikan people calling for the police to be armed.

One of the consequences of this calculated underhand plan to arm the police, was an alarming rise in the number of the police murders carried out against innocent unsuspecting Afrikan people. The institutionally racist metropolitan police force abused their new weapons with devastating effects. For instance, on 8th May 1996 Brian Douglas was murdered by the British police using their deadly new toy, a kung fu style Baton. Similarly, on 16th December 1994 Shiji Lapite was murdered by British police officers wielding their new CS spray weapons. On 16th July 2001 Derek Bennett was shot five times in the back; on 30th April 2005 Azelle Rodney was shot five times in the head and twice in the back and on 15th May 2007 Terry Nicholas was shot whilst standing stark naked in the street. All of these Afrikan victims were murdered by gun toting police officers using rapid fire super machine gun style rifles issued to them by the British state.

4.2 A multi-fronted attack on the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community

Afrikan people were now being shot dead by the police force as well as fellow Afrikans and any other parties able to get their hands on the guns brought to London as a part of the British government's plan. The situation eventually got so bad that:

“... shootings were routinely happening up to four times a week on the streets of London and no one outside the immediate area had even heard about it.” (Davison, 1997, p. 142).

Gun related crime in the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community continued to escalate. Those who did not know that it was a genocide planned by the British police force thought that the situation was genuinely spiralling out of control. In fact, everything that happened had been publicly forecasted by the British police. The consequences of the police commissioner's plan for the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community were catastrophic; murder after murder remained completely unsolved. The situation was so outrageously bad that even the self confessed Afrikan traitor, police officer Philip Etienne was forced to concede that:

“As the months went by, the situation got more and more out of control. Drive by shootings and cold blooded executions in broad daylight became so commonplace they no longer made the front pages of newspapers. Sometimes they were hardly reported at all.” (Etienne & Maynard, 2000, p. 71)

The marginalisation of gun murders specifically targeted against the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community, whether perpetrated by civilian, official police or secret police killer mercenary forces has, until very recently, been systematically practiced with unrelenting vigour. This policy of hiding the murders from the general public was clearly part of the police commissioner's plan. It has been so blatantly practiced, that even an enemy journalist has been moved to admit that:

"... [anti-Afrikan] violence in ... British inner cities is often ignored by the media or purposefully kept quiet by the police ... [and] ... gun related incidents ... were not even reported in the local press ... Put bluntly, it is fair to assume that if more white people were being shot and terrorised then the response would be different". (Davison, 1997, p. 9)

5 Guns and the attack on innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities

5.1 Preventing guns from breeding death and destruction

Guns are unique 'instruments' or 'tools' in that they are primarily designed for the purpose of killing human beings. They therefore have an impact on the level or calibre of violence in societies that differs from other tools. In many cases, the impact is profoundly negative. In fact:

"... There is a universal understanding that if weapons are present it will breed conflict ... [furthermore] ... Periods of extreme armed violence breed a culture of violence ... [and] ... if weapons are not removed and alternative viable methods are not found, the risk of injury remains high, because the continued availability of weapons provides a violent means to resolve disputes." (Hillier, 2003, p. 11)

This evidence clearly demonstrates that the presence of guns in a community brings new violence; they intensify the level and calibre of violence; they raise the level of violence to more dangerous heights and they contribute to making extreme violence a community norm. It therefore follows that ending gun violence in the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community primarily means stopping the supply of police or state sponsored guns into the community. The idea of cutting off the supply of state sponsored guns in order to eliminate their presence in Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain is supported by experiences on the ground in other communities around the world inflicted with this problem. For instance, agencies seeking to stop gun killings in communities in Mali inform us that:

"The best strategy for prevention of armed conflict is to eliminate the means of violence." (Hillier, 2003, p. 79)

In other words, if the guns are removed, the most critical step has been taken towards solving the problem of gun killings. On a similar note, feedback has been received from the

Philippines via the Ortigas Peace Institute which has summarised that community's experience by saying:

"We've been working on arms issues in communities for years ... we now realise that our work on arms in communities will not be successful without addressing the inflow of arms." (Hillier, 2003, p. 76)

The similarity of the conclusions of organisations working on solving gun crime in affected communities around the globe is so striking that it leaves little doubt about the direction a solution should take. If the British government is genuinely seeking to stop gun killings in the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community, it must focus its attention primarily on stopping the guns from reaching the community. The next important dimension will be on removing those guns that are already in the community. In genuinely tackling the inward flow of arms, it will be necessary to address:

"Both the state sanctioned trade and the illicit trade in arms ... in order to prevent irresponsible use of firearms and the horrific human cost that ensues ..." (Hillier, 2003, p. 54)

Whilst blocking the inward flow of state sponsored arms into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community is not the only area for action, real life experiences demonstrate that it is a critical component for those who are serious about eliminating gun violence.

5.2 The British government's theoretical duty to protect its citizens

In theory, under article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the British government has a duty to protect the lives of its Afrikan and other citizens. This duty to protect lives has been enshrined in UK law via the Human Rights Act, 1998 (Hanson, 2003, p. 123). It is an obvious truth therefore that the British government has:

“... an obligation to protect [its] own citizens ... [which] must involve working to stem the flow of arms and to stop arms abuse.” (Hillier, 2003, p. 70)

However, with the number of Afrikan people having been shot dead over the last 15 years well into triple figures, it is evident that the British government has failed in this duty; the British government clearly does not prevent the flow of guns into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain and many Afrikan lives are lost as a result.

Nor is the British government's failure to stem the flow of guns in order to protect the lives of Afrikan people in Britain the result of accidental incidents or incompetent management; it is part of a calculated systematic plan. Firstly, there is an emerging body of evidence which demonstrates how the British government has actually created and sponsored gun violence in the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community. It is known to have actually employed killer mercenary gunmen to commit acts of terrorism against innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain (Gillard, 2004, p. 406).

Secondly, the lack of effective arms controls by the British state is a critical factor that results in a direct threat by force of arms to Afrikan people's lives. The absence of controls encourages an unsafe environment and constitutes a direct threat to the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community's means of survival and general sense of security. Thirdly, the British government places a higher value on the profits of gun manufacturers and traders than it does on the lives of Afrikan people. Successive British governments have a long history of being intimately involved in and actively supporting the interests of the arms industry (Sampson, 1978, p. 40). This support has been ongoing, despite the British government's knowledge of the fact that:

“... the [arms] industry is the second most likely to involve bribes...” (Hillier, 2003, p. 55)

The British government's habit has been to collude with the arms industry; to actively participate in the arms industry; and to profit from the arms industry; whilst leaving the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain to pick up an increased death toll.

5.3 Merchants of death: Government gun smugglers and traders at work

Oxfam and Amnesty International point out that:

"The primary responsibility for the flow of arms into a country rests with governments – *all* governments that export, re-export, or import arms." (Hillier, 2003, p. 72)

The leading exporter of arms in the world is the government of US Satan, a nation with a shameful record in the area of arms smuggling. For instance, during a televised congressional hearing held in US Satan in 1987, it was revealed that Colonel Oliver North, a senior officer of the US Satan army, CIA director William Casey and other US Satan officials solicited the services of two allegedly 'retired' US Satan Generals to smuggle guns. Major General Richard Secord and Major General John Singlaud were commissioned to secretly smuggle massive quantities of arms which they procured in Europe:

"... between October 1984 and October 1986 more than \$50 million worth of arms - including rifles, ammunition, claymore mines, mortars, and rockets – flowed to the contras through this clandestine mechanism." (Klare & Kornbluh, 1988, p. 156)

This illegal smuggling campaign was not that of a rogue set of criminals carrying out secret arms deals purely for the purpose of making a personal profit. Rather, these criminals were working both directly and indirectly for the US Satan government. Their illegal gun smuggling escapade was officially sanctioned in the US Satan white house under the title 'project democracy'.

One of the most surprising aspects of this illegal US Satan government sponsored gun smuggling exercise was its sheer scale. With \$50 million dollars worth of illegal arms being secretly shipped around the world, there is no guarantee that all of the arms purchased reached their supposed destination. The notion that a proportion of those illegal arms could have been filtered out and redirected through secret illegal processes into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain, cannot be discounted.

As the second largest exporters of guns in the world, the British government is not an innocent onlooker in this evil environment of illegal gun running (Hillier, 2003, p. 58). It actively participates in this corrupt industry despite the fact that it is aware that it has a duty is to prevent:

"Arms [getting] into the wrong hands through weak controls on firearm ownership, [poor] weapons management, and misuse by authorised users of weapons." (Hillier, 2003, p. 54)

Careful scrutiny of British newspapers occasionally reveals stories about individuals being

convicted for smuggling guns and other arms. The ironic thing is that the individuals always seem to be connected in some way with the British state. For instance, an ex-soldier, private Nicholas Hall was jailed for 2 years for gun running following a Court Marshall (Burchett, 1977, p. 27). Another example comes in the form of Leslie Aspin who was described by the Sunday Times as the:

“... former smuggler and double [British secret] agent who negotiated the *Claudia* arms consignment.” (Burchett, 1977, p. 30)

The *Claudia* was a freighter which was seized off the Irish coast with 5 tonnes of arms on board. An even more significant problem with this seizure was that there should have been 100 tonnes of arms on board. The whereabouts of the missing 95 tonnes never came to light. This represents clear proof that arms dealers working under the instructions of the British government are directly involved in the dishonest movement and subsequent disappearance of illegal arms. Where illegal firearms disappear in this way, it is possible that a proportion of them can turn up in the innocent unsuspecting African community in Britain. Where arms do turn up in this way, they do so with the assistance of the British government – through their agents, the gun dealers.

There are also instances of guns being smuggled across borders on behalf of the British state by British spies disguised as arms dealers. One recent example came in 2004 when a self-confessed arms smuggler Peter Bleach was released from an Indian prison following the intervention of the British government.

“In December 1995, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in smuggling 300 AK-47's, 15 Makarov pistols, two sniper rifles, 24,000 rounds of ammunition, 10 rocket launchers and 100 anti-tank grenades ...” (Machon, 2005, p. 262)

On the surface, this crook was the founder of a 'legitimate' arms dealing firm, Aeroserve UK. However, he publicly admitted to being an MI5 and special branch British police spy. This revelation is consistent with the fact that the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw made public representations on his behalf in an endeavour to have him released from prison. Furthermore, Robin Cook the Foreign Secretary at the time went further and made written representations in order to secure his release. All of this official British government activity to support this convicted criminal happened despite the fact that he had admitted smuggling arms. The significance of the interventions by these particular British Cabinet Ministers is that:

“... Ministers in each department are supposed to be in charge of their respective intelligence agencies: the Home Secretary for MI5, the Defence Secretary for DIS, while MI6 and GCHQ are

supposed to work under the Foreign Secretary." (Bloch, 1983, p. 52)

Furthermore, another self-confessed former MI5 spy, Annie Machon, has indicated that Bleach was indeed a British spy, but argued that he was really an MI6 agent. She says:

"[Bleache's] background is ... typical of an MI6 agent: public school, Army intelligence corps, small businessman involved in the arms trade. However, the clearest indication that Bleach was working for MI6 comes in the efforts ministers made to secure his release ..." (Machon, 2005, p. 267)

What we have here, is the benefit of one self confessed British spy, revealing the inside story of how another self-confessed British spy smuggled arms across international borders on behalf of the British government. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that Bleach's company Aerospace UK was really one of potentially many examples of fronts used by the British state to secretly smuggle arms on its behalf. An undisclosed network of similar companies could be used to secretly smuggle arms to any destination in the world on an as and when required basis.

Lack of information makes it impossible to confirm that any of the examples above directly resulted in guns entering the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain. Nonetheless, these examples of arms smuggling, by the British state and other criminal elements go some way towards explaining the processes involved in getting guns, which are not produced by Afrikan people, into innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain. It is clear that the guns must emanate from the arms industry and that those guns that do get through are specifically introduced to terrorise and destabilise the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community. Furthermore, the police are fully aware of how guns are deliberately and recklessly injected into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community, but because of their hidden anti-Afrikan agendas escort rather than stop them. A former British police officer with direct personal experience of buying illegal firearms explains that:

"For up and coming criminals who don't want to risk keeping a weapon with them all the time, guns can be 'hired' from gangland armouries. The terms vary but generally involve a fee plus a returnable deposit. If the gun is fired, the deposit is retained and the renter is obliged to dispose of the weapon themselves ... [because] ... Modern forensic techniques make it easy to match bullet fragments or shells to a particular gun ..." (Bernard & Etienne, 2000, p. 152)

5.4 Gun profits more important than Afrikan people's lives

Hundreds of Afrikan people in Britain have lost their lives as a result of the corrupt practices of the arms industry. Whilst it is reasonable to conclude that dishonest gun producers contribute to this calamity, there is little evidence that the British government is taking any action against them. Nor is it clear what level of success the British government are experiencing in closing

down gun producers that are guilty of carrying out this kind of deadly misdemeanour. Drastic action is obviously needed in this area, because if manufacturers are producing guns and 'traders' are selling guns to gangsters, then it is obvious that the manufacturers and 'traders' have a responsibility for supplying the weapons used in the killing and maiming of members of the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain.

Indeed the evidence coming from one former British spy suggests that the problem is even deeper than it at first appears because of the hidden role of the British government:

"The part played by private enterprise in the British covert action programme is highly significant ... The manner in which private contracts in the field are obtained and executed are clearly aimed at obscuring the distinction between commercial activity and government inspired foreign policy initiatives." (Bloch, 1983, p. 52)

Virtually all of the guns that find their way into the innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community in Britain are sold to petty gangsters. The irony is that these guns are produced 'officially' and 'openly' by 'above the board', but often unscrupulous gun manufacturers with hidden government agendas. We can say for certain that the British government knows exactly who these gun manufacturers are. The British state's own records confirm that:

"Three quarters of the firearms seized by police in London were air pistols, converted by gangs into .22mm and .38mm cartridge pistols, and supplied by one UK Company from stock made in Germany." (Hillier, 2003, p. 50)

If the British government was genuinely attempting to eliminate gun crime in Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities based in London, it would close down this company as a matter of urgency. The British government knows the exact source of many of the guns being used to kill Afrikan people on its streets. On the face of it, all it takes to remove something in the order of ¾ of the guns from the streets of London is to put this one company out of business. That single action would, over a period of years, save hundreds of lives. Yet instead of taking this obvious action in order to prevent further gun killings in innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities, it colludes with the gun dealing merchants of death.

Instead of genuinely attempting to put an end to gun crime by stopping the inward flow of arms, the British government harasses Afrikan youths as part of its 'blame the victim strategy'. Whilst Afrikan young people are being randomly stopped and search on the pretext of looking for lethal weapons, the truth is that guns on the streets of Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities in Britain are there through a combination of untrustworthy arms dealers and an underhand anti-Afrikan state policy. Neither the British government nor the gun producers can be trusted to keep their guns out of Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan communities.

Criminals merely need a combination of money and a willing supplier to get their hands on guns and the British government guarantees the availability of supplies.

We can reasonably conclude that both the British government and its arms producing collaborators are the objective enemies of Afrikan people. The British government, together with other oppressive governments, systematically plan the destruction of Afrikan people in Britain and around the world; the arms dealers make massive profits by providing the British and other oppressive governments with the means to carry out their genocidal plans against innocent unsuspecting Afrikan people.

6 Our objective is to stop the gun killings on our streets

6.1 Draft campaign outline

It is wholly unacceptable that there should be even a single murder on the streets of Britain. It is therefore completely unacceptable that a large number of Afrikan people (Who constitute a tiny proportion of the population of Britain) should be the murder victims of gun toting killers. The suppliers of guns are the source of gun killings; therefore the killers (who commit the crimes) and their fire arm suppliers (who supply the means) must be exposed, captured and brought to justice.

In an attempt to counter and put an end to the genocide affecting Afrikan young people and others on the streets of Britain, the Pan-Afrikan Society Community Forum proposes: (i) the fingerprinting, (ii) the DNA testing, (iii) the collation of the car registration numbers, (iv) the phone tapping, (v) the inclusion in a regime of targeted homes raids, and, (vi) the inclusion in a regime of regular targeted stop and search of every individual in Britain known:

- To have a licence to hold a fire arm
- To have a reason to handle a fire arm, regardless of their purpose
- To have an official role in the British arms industry
- To be a member of a gun club or any ballistic association

These measures are to apply to each and every individual involved in the production, distribution and exchange of fire arms; it includes all replica fire arms which have the capacity to be converted into a weapon capable of causing a ballistic injury. These measures are also to include regular targeted raids on each and every business activity and location where fire arms are produced, held, distributed, exchanged and used. This should be seen as the first stage in the banning of the carrying and use of all guns in Britain.

Even though these measures can be said to have a detrimental effect on the civil liberties of those people involved in the ballistic weapons industry, they are proposed on the grounds that they are in the interest of the greater societal good i.e. general public safety. Against the

background of the murders being committed on the streets of Britain, these measures represent a small sacrifice on the part of those who choose to make the fire arms industry their area for economic gain or leisurely enjoyment.

The results of these research measures should be collated and held on a computerised database. Since the Innocent unsuspecting Afrikan community is disproportionately adversely affected by the gun murders in Britain, the contents of the database must be confidentially held and maintained by revolutionary Pan-Afrikanist organisations of the Afrikan community's choosing.

The incompetence or otherwise of police and other state agencies' investigative procedures have led to an unacceptably high proportion of the murderers of Afrikan people getting away 'Scott free'. It is therefore proposed that when any person in the community, regardless of race, is murdered by a ballistic weapon, their next of kin or the agreed representative of their next of kin must be allowed access to the information held on the database as a means to furthering their enquiries into who was involved in the murder of their loved ones.

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